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Bond Market in Turmoil 
In the last two months, financial markets have 
gone through another wrenching adjustment 
-a  new episode in a year-and-a-half long 
period ofturmoil. Indeed, one can pointto 
October 1979 -the  date of  a major change in 
Federal Reserve operating procedures-as 
the beginning of  this period of  turmoil. Atthat 
time, the Fed began to place more emphasis 
on controlling the quantity of bank reserves 
than on tightly pegging the cost of  those 
reserves (the Federal-funds rate). 
It was neither surprising nor unusual that 
short-term interest rates exhibited much more 
vari abi I  ity in the wake of  that watershed date. 
Both policymakers and economists have 
been surprised, however, by the sharply 
increased variability in long-term interest 
.  rates. As the new operating procedures were 
designed to improve the Federal Reserve's 
chances of  achieving long:-run money-supply 
targets, it wou  Id have been reasonable to 
expect lowered inflation expectations and, 
therefore, lowered long-term interest rates. 
But in reality, long-term rates have risen to 
higher levels and shown more variance since 
October 1979 than ever before. 
Two components of yield 
To understand the sources of  this situation, 
one must determine which factor plays the 
major role-the  bond yield's real component 
or its inflation-expectations component. 
Unfortunately, we have no direct evidence 
for the United States on the decomposition of 
long-term interest rates into their real and 
inflation components. Such evidence would 
require a bond with a value indexed to the 
price level, sothatthecurrentyieldwould not 
explicitly incorporate an inflation premium. 
However, we do have available an indirect 
proxy for an index-linked security-the 
current yield on stocks. A holder of stock 
(equity) can expect to participate in a 
corporation's future profits and dividends, 
while a holder of a bond (debt) can expect to 
receive a contractually fixed dollar amount 
per year over the life of  the security. The 
current stock yield-the dividend divided by 
the stock price-need not incorporate an 
inflation forecast. This is true because a rise in 
inflation expectations; with no other change 
in the real economy, would leave the current 
stock yield unaffected as stockholders raise 
their expectations of future dividend growth 
by an equal amount.*  . 
It should also be noted that the risks in stock 
ownership are greater than in bond owner-
ship, suggesting a higher average real return 
to stocks than bonds. However, a stable 
stock-market yield also suggests stability in 
the real rate of  return. In that case, changes in 
the bond yield relative to the stock yield 
would provide an indirect measure of 
changes in inflation expectations. 
Stock vs. bond yields 
An analysis of relative changes in yields over 
the 1952-81 period suggests several 
conclusions about cyclical and secular 
movements in yields (Chart 1). First, stock 
and bond yields have tended to move in the 
same pattern over the business cycle. Both 
yields riseduringthe late expansion and early 
recession because of reduced liquidity and 
increased risk, and fall in the late recession 
and early expansion because-of increased 
liquidity and decreased risk. Second, the 
bond yield-unlike the stock yield-has 
*It is widely believed that tax distortions bias the current 
stock yield during periods of inflation. This occurs 
because of  the valuation of  capital stock at historic rather 
than replacement cost, and because of  the overstatement 
of  corporate profits. However, as the author has shown 
elsewhere (Bell Journal of  Economics, Spring 1976), this 
source of bias is largely offset by the under-reporting of 
corporate profits that occurs because the real cost of 
bond debt declines with inflation. Onlyin the case of 
regulated utilities, which must pass on the inflation 
benefits of bond financing to their customers, have 
current stock yields risen proportionately with bond 
yields and the expected inflation rate. OrJilllon':.  in  thi~, nevv:-;Ietter do nol 
nC'(_L'~Js,-Hilv reflect  the vi(::,\vs  of the  nlana~~erneni 
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tended to rise with the inflation rate. This is 
not surprising since (as noted earlier) current 
stock yields need not incorporate explicitly 
an inflation-expectations component. Third, 
the secu lar trend of stock yields has varied 
with the risk and uncertainty in the economy. 
The average yield declined from 6 percent to 
under 4 percent in the mid-1950s, when it 
became apparent that the post-World War II 
economy wou  Id be more stable than the 
inter-war period of  the 1920s and 1930s. But 
the yield then increased again, to almost 6 
percent, following the unusual economic 
shocks experienced in the first half of  the 
1970s. The secular changes in stock yields 
were not paralleled in bond yields, however, 
because the latter are subject to less 
non-inflation risk. 
An analysis of  the last three years suggests 
one important lesson (Chart 2). During this 
period, the current yield on stocks has been 
unusually stable, fluctuating in a narrow 
range between 5 and 6 percent -but  the 
current yield on bonds has varied 
considerably, especially since October 1979. 
This suggests that most of the bond-market 
variability has been due to revisions in 
long-run inflation expectations. Real shocks 
to the economy wou  Id have been mirrored in 
parallel movements in stock and 
bond-market yields. 
Impact of expectations 
How have inflation expectations affected 
bond-market yields? First, long-run 
(5-to-7  -year) inflation expectations are based 
mostly on expectations about the growth rate 
of  the money supply, because financial-
market participants place great weight on 
monetary developments in determining their 
long-run view of inflation. 
Second, the expected growth of Federal 
government debt is the major factor 
underlying the expected future growth of  the 
u.S. money supply. In this country, unlike 
certain others, a close historic relationship 
has existed between the growth in national 
debt and money throughout most of the 
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post-war period. (See our Weekly Letters of 
February 27 and April 24, 1981.) 
Third, over the last year-and-a-half, the bond 
market has reacted negatively to first the 
Carter and later the Reagan budget programs. 
In January 1980, bond yields increased 
dramatically in the face of  the last Carter 
budget, which incorporated a major increase 
in defense spending with no parallel cut in 
non-defense spending. By the same token, 
bond yields have also risen dramatically in 
the wake of  the Reagan budget program, 
which many market participants interpreted 
as reducing taxes by a larger amountthan the 
net reduction in government spending. One 
can interpret both of  these episodes as 
representing market fears that an increase in 
government debt wi  II adversely affect mOrley 
growth and inflation, leading to higher 
long-term interest rates. 
Recent rate fluctuations 
While the link between the government debt 
and money growth may explain the high 
level of  long-term rates, itfails to explain their 
unusual variations over the last eighteen 
months (Chart 2). Most of  the downward 
movement in long-term rates occurred in the 
period from April to July 1980, which 
corresponded with the imposition and 
subsequent removal of  the Federal Reserve 
Special Credit Control Program. While 
analysts have not sorted out all of  the 
implications of  that unique event, it clearly 
led to a major change in the behavior of 
households, temporarily (and dramatically) 
increasing their savings rate. Consumers may 
have believed, when this announcement was 
made, that itwould lead to a major  decline in 
the expected rate of inflation and (given 
current tax rates) create a major incentive to 
increase savings. The latter factor suggests a 
decline in the real interest rate-which 
apparently occurred, in view of  the moderate 
decline in the current stock yield (lagged one 
month). Except for this period of  the Credit 
Control Program and its immediate 
aftermath, long-term interest rates primarily 
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How can investor expectations of rising debt 
(and rising inflation) be changed, to bring  . 
about a decline in long-term bond rates? This 
can be accomplished either by reducing the 
growth in the expected government debt or 
by breaking the link between the debt and 
money. Investors may change their 
expectations regarding the growth in the 
national debt in one of  two ways. First, they 
may acceptthe supply-side theory behind the 
Reagan tax cut, which states that an increase 
in the tax base wi  II be proportionate to the 
decrease in the tax rate. But it's unlikely that 
people will accept supply-side arguments in 
the future if  they have not already done so. 
Second, investors may change their view 
about debt growth if  they expect Congress to 
accept most of  the Reagan spending-cut 
proposals but less of  the tax-cut proposals. 
This is the more likely source of  a diminished 
growth of  the national debt. 
Investors may also change their views 
regarding the link between the national debt 
and money supply. Historically, the only 
recent period of rising debt and slower 
money growth was 1974-75-a period 
encompassing the largest business-cycle 
contraction in the post-World War II period. 
This recession permitted finarrcial markets to 
absorb a large increase in the national debt 
without putting upward pressure on interest 
rates-and therefore eased the pressure on 
the Federal Reserve to monetize the debt. 
This same 1974-75 period is now recognized 
as a time of reduced demand for money, 
primarily related to regulatory changes which 
permitted a major reduction in business and 
government holdings of money. This may 
have permitted a one-time substitution of 
money for bonds without corresponding 
upward pressures on interest rates. 
Prospects for 1981-82 
I  It is not likely  that a similar episode will occur 
again in 1981-82. Given the current and 
expected strength in the domestic economy, 
another recession-caused break in the 
money-debt link is remote. A repeat of  the 
downward adjustment in money demand is 
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less remote-but still unlikely. Recent 
regulatory changes, primarily with respectto 
allowing households to economize in money 
balances, perhaps could lead to a repeat of 
the 1974-75 episode. However, it is risky to 
base pol  icy on such an expectation. 
Still, the Federal Reserve, by the very nature 
of its changed operating procedures, could 
break the link between the national debt and 
money. Under its old procedures, attempts to 
stabilize short-term interest.rates tended to 
lead to excessive money-supply groWth 
when large debt growth put upward pressure 
on interest rates. But under its new 
procedures, the Fed has allowed short-term 
interest rates to rise, sometimes dramatically, 
in the face of large increases in credit 
demand, including increases in federal debt. 
The market seems to have accepted the 
implications of  the Fed's new operating 
procedures for much sharper variations in 
short-term interest rates, as a consequence of 
the Fed's attempts to achieve better short-run 
control of money. However, after watching 
the Federal Reserve overshoot its M 1 target 
for four straight years, the financial markets 
seem unwilling to translate this better 
short-run monetary control into confidence 
that the Fed will hit its long-run monetary 
target in 1981 and beyond. The 1980 
overshoot (even though much smaller than in 
previous years) may have convinced 
financial markets that the close debt-money 
link continues even under the new operating 
procedures. A month of rapid money-supply 
growth, such as April, may then confirm these 
fears-leading market participants to believe 
that future money growth can be better 
forecast on the basis of  expected growth of 
debt than on the basis of Federal Reserve 
long-run money-supply targets. If, in the 
months ahead, money growth stays within its 
long-run target ranges, the markets may begin 
to base their money-growth expectations 
more firmly on the Fed's announced targets. 
When that occurs, long-term bond yields 
should begin to decline. 
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BANKING DATA-TWELFTH FEDERAL RESERVE DISTRICT 
(Dollar amounts in millions) 
Selected Assets and Liabilities 
Large Commercial Banles 
Loans (gross, adjusted) and investments* 
Loans (gross, adjusted) - total# 
Commercial and industrial 
Real estate 
Loans to individuals 
Securities loans 
U.s. Treasury securities* 
Other securities* 
Demand deposits - total# 
Demand deposits - ad justed 
Savings deposits - total 
Time deposits - total# 
Individuals, part. & corp. 
(Large negotiable CD's) 
Weekly Averages 
of Daily Figures 
Member Bank Reserve Position 
Excess Reserves (+  )/Deficiency (-) 
Borrowings 
Net free reserves (  +  )/Net borrowed( - ) 
* Excludes trading account securities. 
#  Includes items not shown separately. 
Amount 
Outstanding 
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Change from 
year ago 
Dollar  Percent 
10,849  7.9 
10,556  9.1 
3,539  10.5 
5,504  11.8 
1,178  - 4.9 
637  72.7 
18  0.3 
279  1.8 
1/652  - 4.0 
2,562  - 8.6 
~,567  13.4 
15,477  24.0 
14,844  26.7 
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